Rackspace blog post (#1819)
## Description Adds a slightly-edited version of the Rackspace blog post.
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website/blog/2022-12-16-not-your-backups-not-your-data.md
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---
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slug: not-your-backups-not-your-data
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title: "Not your backups, not your data: A Rackspace story"
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description: "Rackspace email outage: What happened, what went wrong, best practices, and paths forawrd to protect your business email and data."
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authors: nica
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tags: [corso, microsoft 365, ransomware]
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date: 2022-12-16
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image: ./images/not_your_backups_not_your_data.png
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---
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Rackspace is having a rough few days.
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## The story thus far
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Rackspace Technology announced on December 7th that, six days after
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suffering a ransomware attack, they're still unable to determine when
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normal email service will be restored to the thousands of hosted
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Microsoft Exchange customers. They asked for customers' patience and
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provided temporary email fixes as they continue to investigate the
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attack that began late last week and has caused ongoing disruptions.
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Service interruptions started on December 5th with no end in sight.
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<!-- truncate -->
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“While the investigation is ongoing and in its early stages, at this
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time, we're unable to provide any timeline or expectations for
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restoration to the Hosted Exchange environment,” said an official
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forum post last Wednesday, “we're working to provide customers with
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archives of inboxes where available.”
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Rackspace, which has been stressing many administrators out with its
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lack of transparency and accessibility during the outage crisis, is
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doing all it can to fix the disrupted service, including throwing as
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many employees at the problem as possible. However, they remain
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tight-lipped about what customer info might have been accessed.
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## No end in sight
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Rackspace has confirmed the attack was ransomware, and in the meantime
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it’s recommending users shift to Microsoft 365, saying: “we're
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working diligently to meet our customers' needs regarding access to
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email and email forwarding. As noted in our recent updates, we've
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arranged for all Hosted Exchange customers to have access to Microsoft
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365”
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[Read the full post from Rackspace
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here.](https://status.apps.rackspace.com/index/viewincidents?service=6&start=1670216400)
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The company doesn’t want to release full details of the incident,
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saying that it’s under active investigation, but it can be
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difficult to feel secure not knowing any details of the incursion.
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## What went wrong
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Rackspace is a large company, with 6,000 employees and over 3 billion
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in annual revenue. As such this situation is a surprising one. The
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company isn't sharing the details of the breach, but the issue isn't
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that their security was breached, that production data stores were
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compromised, or that this affected users' access. The issue is that
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Rackspace has no plan for recovery (as far as customers are concerned,
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an inadequate plan, as seen in [the Atlassian data
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outage](https://www.atlassian.com/engineering/post-incident-review-april-2022-outage),
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is the same thing as no plan). Demanding perfection isn't a path to
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resilience.
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Rackspace has been around for a long time and effective operations are
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really their main selling point, as such they should have had an
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effective:
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- Backup system Disaster Recovery Plan Ransomware Plan
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Notably, these three plans aren't identical, but they should all be in
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place to ensure that the company can recover from any incident.
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Backup systems are essential for ensuring data is safe and secure, as
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well as providing a way to restore lost or corrupted files. Disaster
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Recovery Plans provide guidance on how to respond when an unexpected
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event occurs, such as a natural disaster or cyberattack. Ransomware
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plans help protect against malicious actors who may attempt to hold
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your data hostage by encrypting it until you pay them money.
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As the saying goes, a backup is only as good as your recovery.
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We believe that Rackspace likely had runbooks and backup and recovery
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plans for the above but, as seen in the [Gitlab data loss
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incident](https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2017/02/10/postmortem-of-database-outage-of-january-31/)
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a few years ago, without frequent testing and verification, these
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plans aren’t meaningful. These plans need to be updated to reflect the
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constant security attacks we find ourselves under these days. Backups,
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in particular, need to be hardened and made immutable to prevent
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ransomware from modifying or deleting them.
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It should also be stressed that a backup is meaningless if it can't
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be restored in a short period of time. If an organization needs
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multiple weeks to restore something as critical to a business as email
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and data access, that's equivalent to a total data loss and can be a
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company-ending event for the organization’s customers.
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Rackspace needs to take steps immediately towards verifying and
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testing these plans and implementing them into their operations so
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that they can better prepare themselves for future incidents like this
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one. They need to invest in better security measures such as
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firewalls, antivirus software, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and
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other tools designed specifically with ransomware protection in mind;
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create detailed backup procedures; develop comprehensive recovery
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strategies; train staff on proper response protocols; and regularly
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test their system's resilience against potential threats.
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That said, beyond pointing fingers, what can all of us learn from this?
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## Do you *really* control your data?
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This question, whether your data is really yours, always prompts
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certain members of the chattering classes to say ‘this is why the
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cloud was a mistake’ and recommend some kind of retrograde abandonment
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of current technology. Such types won’t be happy until the first year
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of every startup’s life is spent waiting for backordered RAM. To be
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clear: we'ren’t recommending that you abandon cloud data storage and
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hosting services.
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However, key data ownership principles do dictate that you can't
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fully trust any single public cloud tool with everything.
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## “Not your keys, not your coins” ➡️ “Not your backups, not your data”
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The phrase “Not your keys, not your coins” is a popular saying in the
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cryptocurrency world. It's a reminder to users that if they don't
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have control of their private keys, they don't have control of their
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coins. Private keys are a string of numbers and letters that are used
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to access a cryptocurrency wallet. They're the only way to access the
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funds stored in the wallet, and if someone else has access to the
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private keys, they can access the funds.
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This principle applies to cloud data storage as well: if you have no
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way of exporting all your data, and no backups independent from your
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cloud provider, you don’t really ‘own’ your data and will be at the
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mercy of whatever vagaries beset that provider.
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Incidents like this one with Rackspace aren’t all that common, and
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they shouldn’t be, but they do happen. When they do, you don’t want to
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be at the mercy of the primary provider’s backup and restore SLAs (or
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lack thereof). Instead, we recommend exploring some straightforward
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ways to protect yourself by owning your own backups. If you control
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your own backups, you also control where you can restore it for
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temporary access and thereby sidestepping the failed infrastructure,
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the latency of restores to prevent being at the back of the line in
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the restore queue, the ability to permanently move your data to a
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different infrastructure provider to reduce lock-in with unreliable
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vendors, and more!
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## Our recommendations
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### Understand your provider’s responsibility model
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As the data owner or IT lead, you should:
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1. Research the cloud provider's Service Level Agreement (SLA) to
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understand the responsibilities and liabilities associated with
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service delivery (for example, see [Microsoft’s shared responsibility
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model](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/shared-responsibility)).
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2. If your cloud or service provider doesn’t have a well-defined risk
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model and you don’t have other reasonable options, ask as many
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questions as possible during the on-boarding process in order to gain
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a full understanding of your responsibilities and any other
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obligations that need to be met. 3. Familiarize yourself with not
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just your company’s backup and retention policies but also industry
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standards and regulations related to data security, privacy, and
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compliance with applicable laws that may apply when utilizing cloud
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services from your particular provider.
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### Have you own backups on an independent platform
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While we disagree with the [3–2–1 backup
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rule](https://www.uschamber.com/co/run/technology/3-2-1-backup-rule)
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in today’s cloud environments (more in a different blog post), you
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shouldn't store your backups on the same system or infrastructure as
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your primary data. Otherwise, you will likely lose access, often
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permanently, to your backups when you need them the most.
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However, you also don’t need to buy on-prem backup appliances, build a
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bespoke storage system, or jump through any hoops to create an
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independent backup copy. Find a modern backup tool that optimizes for
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usability and supports cloud object storage (S3, Azure Blob,
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etc.). These tools should support deduplication, compression, and
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encryption to reduce network and storage costs and you should pick a
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cold storage tier to even further reduce any associated backup
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expenses.
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### Test and verify
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Taking backups isn’t enough, you’ve got to try using them, even if
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only as a test. On a frequent basis, ensure that your backups are
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definitely encrypted with keys that you control, use your backup tool
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can verify that the data hasn’t been corrupted (using cryptographic
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hashing), and perform test restores into sandbox
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environments. Ideally, this should be automated with alerts in case of
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failures.
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On a semi-frequent basis, do test restores of varying subsets of your
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data and measure how long it takes to restore it, where the
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bottlenecks might be, and to see how long it would take to recover a
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meaningful amount of data from a major outage. Does that meet your
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SLA? Note that this often doesn’t mean restoring all data immediately
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but a subset of the most recently accessed and modified data to get
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things back up and running.
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## Backing up Microsoft 365
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We would be remiss if we didn’t concretely tie our recommendations
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back to where we started, a large email outage at Rackspace. Rackspace
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has recommended that all customers move to Microsoft 365 and so, we
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will focus on that. Microsoft’s architecture should be a lot more
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stable but the customer’s responsibility hasn’t gone away and
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Microsoft [
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highlights](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/shared-responsibility)
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that on their website when they say that they're responsible for the
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infrastructure but the customer is responsible for their data.
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To help with your portion of the responsibility, we recently release
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[Corso](/), a free, secure, and open-source tool that protects your
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Microsoft 365 data, at low cost, by securely and efficiently backing
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up all business-critical data to object storage.
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You can get started with Corso in [just a few
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minutes](https://corsobackup.io/docs/quickstart) and you will be able
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to move your Microsoft 365 emails and data to your choice of object
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storage provider and location. Not only will Corso compress and
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deduplicated your data, it will also encrypt it with your keys. Corso
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also uses internal checksums to verify the integrity of your data.
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It’s also possible to quickly verify and test your backups with
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Corso. You can restore user data in sandbox environments and accounts
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and perform filtered restores to just bring back subsets of data. Give
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it a try and [let us know what you
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think](https://discord.gg/63DTTSnuhT)!
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vCPUs
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cybercrime
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cyberattacks
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Rackspace
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AWS_SHARED_CREDENTIALS_FILE
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cryptocurrency
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backordered
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Gitlab
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cyberattack
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Atlassian
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SLAs
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runbooks
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